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Office of the Secretary of State
March Fong Eu

1230 J Street
Sacramento, Californill 95814

Elections Division
(916) 445-0820

February 29, 1984

TO:
FROM:

ALL REGISTRARS OF VOTERS OR COUNTY CLERKS

13

..--

ELECTIONS TECHNICIAN

Lewis K. Uhler, the proponent of the BALANCED FEDERAL
BUDGET INITIATIVE, has filed more than the required number
of 393,835 signatures with the counties.
Therefore, pursuant to Elections Code section 3520(d),
you must verify 500 signatures or five percent of the number
of signatures filed, whichever is the greater number. Enclosed
is a set of random numbers generated for your county. The
use of these sheets will ensure that you verify the correct
number of signatures.
You have 15 days from the date you receive this
notification to finish your verification.
Please certify the
count of the number of valid signatures on the enclosed
certificate, and attach a blank copy of the petition section
to the certificate.
If you have any questions, please call me at the above
number.

BJL/da
Enclosure

Office of the Secretary of State
March Fong Eu

1230 J Street
Sacramento, California 95814

Elections Division
(916) 445-0820

February 29, 1984

TO:

ALL REGISTRARS OF VOTERS OR COUNTY CLERKS

FROM:

Lewis K. Uhler, the proponent of the BALANCED FEDERAL
BUDGET INITIATIVE, has filed more than the required number
of 393,835 signatures with the counties.
Therefore, pursuant to Elections Code section 3520(d),
you must verify all the signatures filed with you and certify
the count of the number of valid signatures.
You have 15 days from the date you receive this
notification to finish your verification. Please certify
the count of valid signatures on the enclosed certificate,
and attach a blank copy of the petition section to the
certificate.
If you have any questions, please call me at the above
number.

BJL/da
Enclosure

1230 J Street
Sacramento, California 95814

Office of the Secretary of State
March Fong Eu

Elections Division
(916) 445-0820

February 29, 1984

TO:

REGISTRARS OF VOTERS for the counties of Los Angeles
and San Diego

FROM:
BARBARA J. LE
ELECTIONS TEC

Lewis K. Uhler, the proponent of the BALANCED FEDERAL
BUDGET, has filed more than 393,835 signatures with the
counties.
Therefore, pursuant to Elections Code section 3520(d),
you must verify five percent of the number of signatures
filed.
You have 15 days from February 29, 1984, the date you
were notified by phone, to finish your verification.
Please
certify the count of the number of valid signatures on the
enclosed certificate, and attach a blank copy of the petition
section to the certificate.
If you have any questions, please call me at the above
number.
BJL/da
Enclosure
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Office of the Secretary of State
March Fong Eu

1230 J Street
Sacramento, Californil1 95814

Elections Division

(916) 445-0820

September 23, 1983

TO ALL REGISTRARS OF VOTERS, OR COUNTY CLERKS, AND PROPONENT
Pursuant to Section 3513 of the Elections Code, we transmit herewith a copy
of the Title and Summary prepared by the Attorney General on a proposed
Initiative Measure entitled:
BALANCED FEDERAL BUDGET.
INITIA TIVE STATUTE.
Circulating and Filing Schedule
1. Minimum number of Signatures required •••••••••••••.••••••• 393,835
Cal. Const., Art. II, Sec. 8(b).
2. Official Summary Date .•.••..•.•..•••.•...•...•••.• Friday, 9/23/83
Elec. C., Sec. 3513.
3. Petition Sections:
a. First day Proponent can circulate Sections for signatures •• Friday, 9/23/83
Elec. C., Sec. 3513.
b. Last day Proponent can circulate and file with the county.
All Sections are to be filed at the same time within each
county . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tuesday, 2/21/84+*
Elec. C., Sees. 3513, 3520(a).
c. Last day for county to determine total number of signatures
affixed to petition and to transmit total to the Secretary of
State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tuesday, 2/28/84
(If the Proponent files the petition with the county on a date prior to 2/21/84,

the county has five working days from the filing of the petition to determine
the total number of Signatures affixed to the petition and to transmit the
total to the Secretary of State.) Elec. C., Sec. 3520(b).

*

Date adjusted for official deadline which falls on a holiday. Elec. C., Sec.
60.

+

PLEASE NOTE: To the Proponent who may wish to qualify for the 1984
Primary Election. The law allows up to approximately 58 days to county
election officials for checking and reporting petition signatures and transmitting results. The law also requires that this process be completed 131
days before the election in which the people will vote on the initiative.
It is possible that the county may not need precisely 58 days. But if you
want to be sure that this initiative qualifies for the 1984 Primary Election,
you should file this petition with the county before November 29, 1983.
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d. Secretary of State determines whether the total
number of signatures filed with all county clerks
meets the minimum number of required signatures,
and notifies the counties••••••••••.•••••••••••••• Thursday, 3/1/84**
e. Last day for county to determine total number of
qualified voters who signed the petition, and to
transmit certificate with a blank copy of the
petition to the Secretary of State ••••••.••••.•••••• Friday, 3/16/84
(If the Secretary of State notifies the county to

determine the number of qualified voters who
signed the petition on a date other than 2/28/84,
the last day is not later than the fifteenth day
after county's receipt of notification.)
Elec. C., Sec. 3520(d), (e).
f. If the signature count is more than 433,218 or
less than 354,452, then the Secretary of State
certifies the petition has qualified or failed,
and notifies the counties. If the signature count
is between 354,452 and 433,218 inclusive, then
the Secretary of State notifies the counties
using the random sampling technique to determine the validity of all signatures ••••••.••••••••••• Sunday, 3/18/84**
g. Last day for county to determine actual number
of all qualified voters who signed the petition,
and to transmit certificate with a blank copy of
the petition to the Secretary of State ••••••••••••••• Tuesday, 4/17/84
(If the Secretary of State notifies the county to

determine the number of qualified voters who
have signed the petition on a date other than
3/16/84, the last day is not later than the
thirtieth day after county's receipt of
notification.)
Elec. C., Sec. 3521(b), (c).
h. Secretary of State certifies whether the petition
has been signed by the number of qualified voters
required to declare the petition sufficient•••.••.•...• Thursday, 4/19/84**

**Date varies based on receipt of county certification.

JOliN K. VAN DE KAMP
Attorney General

State of Califomia

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
1515 K STREET, SUITE 511
SACRAMENTO 95814
(916) 445-9555

September 23, 1983

FOILED
Honorable March Fong Eu
Secretary of State
1230 J Street
Sacramento, California 95814

III . . alike of .... Secr.t.ry of .....
.. at. Sta.. of Califer"ra

SEP 23 1983

Dear Mrs. Eu:
Re:

Initiative Title and Summary.
Our File No. SA83RF0020

Pursuant to the provisions of section 3503 and 3513 of the
Elections code, you are hereby notified that on this day we
mailed to the proponent(s) of the above identified proposed
initiative our title and summary.
Enclosed is a copy of our transmittal letter to the
proponent(s), a copy of our title and summary, a declaration
of mailing thereof, and a copy of the proposed measure.
According to information available in our records, the
name(s) and address(es) of the proponent(s) is as stated on
the declaration of mailing.
Very truly yours,
JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP
Attorney General

o,LL
\.........

Y

~~. t h'--

/Robert Burton
Deputy Attorney General
Enclosure

(RF-10, 6/83)
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Date:
September 23, 1983
File No.: SA83RF0020
The Attorney General of California has prepared the
following title and summary of the chief purpose and points
of the proposed measure:
BALANCED FEDERAL BUDGET.

INITIATIVE STATUTE.

Mandates that

California Legislature adopt a specified resolution urging
Congress to submit to the several states for ratification
a United States Constitution amendment to require a balanced
federal budget, with certain exceptions, or, in the alternative,
to call a constitutional convention for sole purpose of
proposing this amendment.

If Legislature does not adopt

this resolution within time specified, suspends payment of
legislators' compensation, benefit, and expenses until
adopted.

Further provides that if Legislature fails to

timely adopt the resolution, the resolution shall be
transmitted to Congress by Secretary of State.

Smrunary of

estimate by Legislative Analyst and Director of Finance
of fiscal impact on state and local governments:

Adoption

of this measure, by itself, would not have any direct
fiscal impact on state or local governments.
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September 23, 1983

Lewis K. Uhler
7330 Morningside Drive
Loomis, California 95650

Re:

Initiative Title and Summary.
Subject: Balanced Federal Budget
Our File No. SA83RF0020

Pursuant to your request, we have prepared the attached
title and summary of the chief purposes and points of the
above identified proposed initiative. A copy of our letter
to the Secretary of State, as required by Elections Code
sections 3503 and 3513, our declaration of mailing, and the
text of your proposal that was considered is attached.
The Secretary of State will be sending your shortly a copy
of the circulating and filing schedule for your proposal
that will be issued by that office.
Please send us a copy of the petition after you have it
printed. This copy is not for our review or approval, but
to supplement our file in this matter.
Very truly yours,

JOHN K. VAN DE KAHP
Attorney General

Robert Burton
Deputy Attorney General
Attachment

(RF-9, 6/83)

(916) -l-lS-95.'J5

DECLARATION OF MAILING
The undersigned Declarant, states as follows:
I am over the age of 18 years and not a proponent
of the within matter; my place of employment and business
address is 1515 K Street, Suite 511, Sacramento, California
95814.
On the date shown below, I mailed a copy or copies
of the attached letter to the proponents, by placing a true
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to the proponents
named below at the addresses indicated, and by sealing and
depositing said envelope or envelopes in the United States
mail at Sacramento, California, with postage prepaid. There
is delivery service by United States mail at each of the
places so addressed, or there is regular communication by
mail between the place of mailing and each of the places so
addressed.
Date of Mailing:

September 23, 1983

Subject:

Balanced Federal Budget

Our File No.:

SA83RF0020

Name of Proponent(s) and Address(es):

LEWIS K. UHLER
7330 Morningside Drive
Loomis, California 95650

I declare under penalty of perjury that the
foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at Sacramento, California on September 23,
1983.

MARSHA L. BIERER
Declarant

(RF-l0a, 1/83)
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Office of the Secretary of State
March Fong Eu

1230

J Street

Sacramento, California 95814

Elections Division
(916) 445-0820

Narch 21, 1984

Mr. Lewis K. Uhler
7330 Morningside Drive
Loomis, CA. 95650
Dear Mr. Uhler:
Pursuant to Section 3523 of the Elections Code~ I hereby
certify that on March 21, 1984 the certificates received
from the County Clerks or Registrars of Voters by the
Secretary of State established that the initiative BALANCED
FEDERAL BUDGET.
INITIATIVE STATuTE~ has been signed by the
requisite number of qualified electors needed to declare the
petition sufficient.
The BALANCED FEDERAL BUDGET.
INITIATIVE
STATUTE is, therefore. qualified for the November 6, 1984
General Election.
Sincerely,

\A,tw.&\ ~

~

}lARCH FONG ED
.MFE: cr

!

\.
Office of the Secretary of State
March Fong Eu

(
1230 J Street
Sacramento, California 95814

Elections Division
(916) 445-0820

March 21, 1984

Mr. Darryl White
Secretary or' the Senate
State Capitol, Room 3045
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Mr. White:
Pursuant to Section 3523.1 of the Elections Code as
added by SB 1412 (Chapter 642, Statutes of 1980), I
am hereby transmitting to you two (2) copies of the
initiative entitled:
BALANCED FEDERAL BUDGET.
This
initiative has qualified for the November 6, 1984
General Election.

MFE:cr
Enclosures

1230 J Street
Sacramento, California 95814

Office of the Secretary of State
March Fong Eu

Elections Division
(916) 445-0820

March 21, 1984
TO ALL COUNTY CLERKS/REGISTRARS OF VOTERS
Pursuant to Section 3523 of the Elections Code, I hereby
certify that on March 21, 1984 the certificates received from
the County Clerks or Registrars of Voters by the Secretary of
State established that the Initiative Statute, BALANCED FEDERAL
BUDGET, has been signed by the requisite number of qualified
electors needed to declare the petition sufficient.
THE BALANCED
FEDERAL BUDGET.
INITIATIVE STATUTE is, therefore, qualified for
the November 6, 1984 General Election.
BALANCED FEDERAL BUDGET.
INITIATIVE STATUTE.
Mandates that California Legislature adopt a
specified resolution urging Congress to submit
to the several states for ratification a United
States Constitution amendment to require a balanced federal budget, with certain exceptions,
or, in the alternative, to call a constitutional
convention for sole purpose of proposing this
amendment.
If Legislature does not adopt this
resolution within time specified, suspends payment of legislators' compensation, benefit, and
expenses until adopted.
Further provides that
if Legislature fails to timely adopt the resolution, the resolution shall be transmitted to
Congress by Secretary of State.
Summary of estimate by Legislative Analyst and Director of Finance
of fiscal impact on state and local governments:
Adoption of this measure, by itself, would not
have any direct fiscal impact on state or local
governments.

~r~~
MARCH FONG EU
MFE:cr
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State Capitol

Sacramento, California 95814

JAMES D. DRISCOLL
CHIEF CLERK

May 14, 1984

Anthony L. Miller
Chief Deputy Secretary
of State
Office of the Secretary
of State
Executive Office
1230 J Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Mr. Miller:
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter,
dated April 27, 1984, transmitting copies of
initiative entitled "Balanced Federal Budget"
(Pursuant to Section 3523.1, Elections Code) •
Your communication has been presented to the
Assembly and referred to the Committee on Elections,
Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments
(See Assembly Journal for May 7, 1984, Page 14370).
Sincerely,

JDD:pc
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For Immediate Release
September 23, 1983

Contact:

Caren Daniels

BALANCED FEDERAL BUDGET INITIATIVE BEGINS, REPORTS EU
SACRAMENTO -- The director of the Loomis-based National Tax
Limitation Committee has once again launched an initiative drive to
amend the U.S. Constitution to require a balanced federal budget,
Secretary of State March Fong Eu announced today (Sept. 23).
Lewis K. Uhler must collect 393,835 signatures of registered voters
to qualify his "Balanced Federal Budget" initiative statute for the
ballot and submit them to county elections officials by Feb. 2, 1984,
the legal 1S0-day deadline.

However, should he wish to qualify the

measure for the June 1984 primary election ballot, all signatures must
be submitted by Nov. 29 to allow sufficient time for full signature
verification.

Mr. Uhler can be reached at (916) 652-0471.

The measure would mandate the California Legislature to adopt and
transmit to the U.s. Congress a resolution asking the Congress "propose and submit to the several states an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States to require, with certain exceptions, that the
federal budget be balanced .•. " or to call a constitutional convention
for the sole purpose of proposing this amendment.

If the Legislature

failed to adopt the resolution within the specified time, all compensation, benefit and expenses for legislators would be suspended until
the resolution was adopted.

Further, if the resolution were not adopted

by the Legislature, it would be transmitted to Congress by the Secretary
of State.
A similar measure, proposed by Mr. Uhler in April of this year,
failed to qualify for the ballot.
A copy of the initiative, its title and summary, and circulation
calendar is attached.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR-CONGRESS
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS et al.

)
)
)

Petitioners,

)
)

v.

)

MARCH FONG EU, as Secretary of
State, etc., et a1.,

)
)

)

S.F. 24746

)

Respondents;

)
)

LEWIS K. UHLER,

)
)

Real Party in

)

Interest~

}

-----------------------------------)
This is an original petition for writ of mandate
to order respondent Eu, the

~ecretary

of State of the

state of California, to refrain from taking any action,
including the expenditure of public funds, to place the
proposed Balanced Federal Budget statutory Initiative on
the November 1984 ballot.ll The principal effect of the
proposed initiative would be to compel the California

11 The other respondents are.Carl Olsen, San
Francisco City Clerk, and Jay Patterson, San Francisco
Registrar of voters. Patterson has filed a disclaimer
indicating that he does not intend to defend the suit.
1

SEE CONCURRING AN~_nISSENTING:OPINIONS

i

r

Legislatu!e, on penalty of loss of salary, to apply to .
Congress to convene a constitutional convention for the
limited and singular purpose of proposing an amendment to
the United States Constitution requiring a balanced federal
budget.

If the Legislature fails to act, the Secretary of

State is directed to apply directly to Congress on behalf of
the people of the State of California.
The fifth Article to the United States Constitution
sets out two alternative methods of proposing constitutional

am~ndments.~1

It provides in relevant part, that "[t]he

Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to thIs Constitution,
or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of
the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all
Intents:and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the
one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by
Congress •

. ."31
--

11 for a discussion of the drafting of article
V, see Dillinger, The Recurring Question of the "Limited"
Constitutional Convention (1979) 88 Yale L.J. 1623, 16241630.
21 The remaining language in article V prohibited
any amendment barring importation of slaves before 1808, and
any amendment depriving a state of equal representation 1n
the senate without its consent.
2

In the two centuries since the Constitution was
promulgated, it has been amended only twenty-six times.
Each of those amendments was proposed by the Congress.

(All

but one were ratified by state legislatures; the Twentyfirst Amendment was ratified by state conventions.)

Al-

though there have been many efforts to call a constitutional
convention to propose amendments, all have failed to secure
applications by the legislatures of the necessary two-thirds
of the states.!/
In recent years a number of persons, including the
current President, have urged the enactment of a

constitu~

tional amendment reQuiring a balanced federal budget.
Numerous bills have been introduced 1n Congress.

Although

the Senate on one occasion approved a proposed constitutional amendment by the necessary two-thirds vote, the
measure

~ailed

in the House of Representatives; thus the

proposed amendment has never been submitted to the states
for ratification.
In the meantime, proponents of the amendment
attempted to avoid the necessity for congressional approval
by resorting to the alternative method of proposing constitutional amendments -- a convention called upon application of

!I See Brinkfield, Problems Relating to a Federal
Constitutional Convention (l957) (Com. printing, House Judiciary Com., 85th Cong., 1st Sess.) The call for a convention
to propose the direct election of senators came within one
state of success, and may have induced Congress to submit
the Seventeenth Amendment to the states for ratification.
3

two-thirds of the states.

As of this writing the legisla-

tures in 32 of the necessary 34 states have formally applied
to the Congress to call such a convention. 11
following this strategy, proponents have regularly
introduced resolutions in the California Legislature calling
for a convention to propose a balanced budget amendment.
The Legislature has held hearings on some of these measures,
but it has declined to adopt any resolution calling for a
federal constitutional convention.

The supporters of the

balanced budget amendment now seek to compel action by the
California Legislature by popular initiative.~/
The proposed initiative reads as follows:
"INITIATIVE MEASURE TO BE SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO THE
VOTERS.

Section One.

(a)

The People of the state of

California hereby mandate that the California Legislature
adopt the following resolution and submit the same to the
Congress of the United States under the provisions of
Article V of the Constitution of the United states:
"That the Congress of the United States is urged to
propose and submit to the several states an amendment to the

11 The applications from the several states
differ as to the exact content of the proposed amendment and
the responsibilities of the proposed convention. It is not
clear whether there are currently 32 valid applications
pending for a constitutional convention.
!' Similar initiatives are pending in at least
two other states, Montana and Washington.
4

·

(

Constitution of the United States to require, with certain
exceptions, that the federal budget be balanced; and
"That application is hereby made to the Congress of
the United states, pursuant to Article V of the Constitution
of the United states, to call a convention for the sole
purpose of proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States to require, with certain exceptions, that the
federal budget be balanced; and
"If the Congress of the United states proposes an
amendment to the Constitution of the United States identical
in subject matter to that contained herein and submits same
to the States for ratification, this application shall no
longer be of any force and effect; and
"This applfcation shall be deemed null and void,
rescinded and of no effect in the event that such convention
not be

~imlted

to such specific and exclusive purposes; and

"This application constitutes a continuing application in

~ccordance

with Article V of the Constitution of the

United States until at least two-thirds of the several States
have made similar applications pursuant to Article V of the
United States Constitution;
Web)

The Secretary of the Senate is hereby

directed to transmit copies of this application, upon its
adoption by the California Legislature, to the President and
Secretary of the United states Senate and the Speaker and

5

Clerk of the House of Representatives of the Congress Of the
United States.
"Section Two.

The following is added to sections

8901 through 8903 and section 9320 of the Government Code
and shall modify, amend or control any other laws or regulations of the State of California similar in subject matter,
heretofore or hereinafter enacted:
ft.

••

If the California Legislature fails to

adopt the resolution set forth in Section One of [this]
initiative measure and submit same to the Congress of the
United states, as required therein, on or before the end .of
the twentieth (20th) legislative day after approval by the
people of the.said initiative measure, or if the legislature adjourns or recesses during the regular session prior
to the twentieth (20th) legislative day without adopting said
resolutton, or having adopted same, repeals, rescinds, nullifies or contradicts said resolution, all payments, compensation, benefits, expenses, perquisites and any other payments
to any member of the California Legislature made pursuant to
this Section shall be suspended as to each and every legislator until such time as the California Legislature adopts
such resolution.

...

"Section Three.

(a)

The people of the State of

California hereby adopt the resolution set forth in Section
One of this initiative measure; and (b)

6

If the California

Legislature fails to adopt the resolution set forth in
""

Section One of this initiative measure within forty (40)
legislative days of the approval of this initiative measure,
the Secretary of State of California shall transmit the
resolution adopted pursuant to this Section to the President
and Secretary of the United States Senate and the Speaker
and Clerk of the House of Representatives of the Congress of
the United States.
"Section Four.

[Limits legislative amendment of

the initiative.]
"Section Five.

If any section or subsection of

this initiative or the aforementioned resolution shall be
held invalid, the remainder of the initative and the aforementioned resoluti9n, to the extent they can be given effect,
or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances_other than those as to which it is held invalid,
shall not be affected thereby, and to this end the provisions
of this chapter are severable."
On March 18, 1984, respondent Secretary of State
certified that the proposed initiative had received sufficient signatures to appear on the November 1984 ballot.
Petitioners, organizations and individual California taxpayers opposed to the initiative,ll filed an original

21 Petitioners are: American Federation of
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations; American Association of University Women, California State Division;
(fn. continued)
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action in this court for writ of mandamus.

We scheduled a

special calendar to consider the matter before the ballots
were printed for the forthcoming election.
We have concluded that the initiative, to the
extent that it applies for a constitutional convention or
requires the Legislature to do so, does not conform to
article V of the United States Constitution.

Article V

provides for applications by the "Legislatures of two-thirds
of the several States," not by the people through the initiative; it envisions legislators free to vote their best
judgment, responsible to their constituents through the
electoral process, not puppet legislators coerced or compelled by loss of salary or otherwise to vote in favor of a
proposal they may believe unwise.
We also conclude that the measure exceeds the scope
of the initiative power under the controlling provisions of "

(fn. 7 continued)
American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California; ACLU
Foundation of Southern California; American Federation of
state, County and Municipal Employees; American Jewish
Committee; Americans United for Separation of" Church and
state; B'nai B'rith International; General Board of Church
and Society, United Methodist Church; National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc.; National
Conference of Catholic Charities; National Council of La
Raza; National Council of Senior Citizens; National Farmers
Union; National Organization for Women; Office for Church in
Society, United Church of Christ; Service Employees International Union; Edward J. Collins; Virginia Diogo; Rabbi
Allen I. Freehling; and Timothy J. Twomey.

8

the Califqrnia Constitution (art. II, § S and art. IV, § 1).
The initiative power is the power to adopt nstatutesn~/ __
to enact laws -- but the crucial provisions of the balanced
budget initiative do not adQpt a statute or enact a law.
They adopt, and mandate the Legislature to adopt, a resolu~

which does not change California law and constitutes

only one step in a process which might eventually amend the
federal Constitution.

Such a resolution is not an exercise

of legislative power reserved to the people under the
California Constitution.
Real party in interest argues that we sh6uld
the people's voice be heard."

nl~t

Even if the initiative is

invalid, he implies, the election will give the voters the
opportunity to express their views on the desirability of a
balanced budget, and the legislators may respond to the
outcome

~f

the election.

This argument misunderstands the

purpose of the initiative in California.
opinion poll.

It is not a public

It is a method of enacting legislation, and

1f the proposed measure does not enact legislation, or if it
seeks to compel legislative action which the electorate has
no power to compel, it should not be on the ballot.

11 The initiative also includes the power to
amend the state Constitution. The balanced budget initiative, however, was denominated as an "initiative statute,"
which requires the signatures of 5 percent of the registered
voters. (Cal. Canst., art. II, §S.) An initiative which
amends the state Constitution requires the signatures of 8
percent of the voters. (1&.)
9

We do not suggest that the voters of Californfa are
without a remedy.

This is an election year, in which all

members of the Assembly and one-half of the state senators
are to be chosen.

Voters for and voters against the

balanced budget proposal have ample opportunity to make
their views known to candidates for legislative seats, and
the legislators will be able to act on those expressed views
in future sessions.
I.

Propriety of Preelection Review

One year ago we considered whether to issue a writ
of mandamus to enjoin a special election called by the
Governor to vote upon a proposed initiative measure redistricting the state Legislature.

(Legislature of the state

of California v. Deukmejian (1983) 34 Cal.3d 658.)

Opponents

of the initiative .contended that redistricting could occur
only

on~e

within the decade following a federal census, and

thus that the initiative, which proposed a second redistricting within the same IO-year period, exceeded the legislative power reserved by the people.

We agreed, and issued

mandamus to bar the election.
Our opinion first discussed the propriety of preelection review.

We began by reciting the general rule that

·'It is usually more appropriate to review constitutional
and other challenges to ballot propositions or initiative
measures after an election rather than to disrupt the

10

,

.

electoral process by preventing the exercise of the

peo~le's

franchise, in the absence of some clear showing of invalidity.

[Citations.]'

(Brosnahan v. Eu (1982) 31 Cal.3d 1, 4.)

That principle is a salutary one, and where appropriate we
adhere to it."

(34 Cal.3d at p. 665.)

We then went on,

however, to note Justice Mosk's separate opinion in
Brosnahan v. Eu, supra.

Justice Mosk had stated that the

general rule inhibiting preelection review "applies only to
the contention that an initiative is unconstitutional
because of its substance.

If it is determined that the

electorate does not have the power to adopt the proposal 1n
the first instance . • • the measure -must be excluded from
the ballot."

(31

Cal.3~

support this exception:

at p. 6.)

He cited examples to

"election officials have been

ordered not to place initiative and referendum proposals on
the ballot on the ground that the electorate did not have
the power to enact them since they were not legislative in
character [citations], the subject was not a municipal
affair [citations], or the proposal amounted to a revision
of the Constitution rather than an amendment thereto
[citation)."

(lB.)

Our opinion in Legislature of the State of
California v. Oeukmejian, supra, 34 Cal.3d 658 endorsed the
standard described by Justice Mosk.

11

"Here," we said, as in

those cases cited by Justice Mask, Wthe challenge goes to
.<
the power of the electorate to adopt the proposal in the

.

first instance ••

.

jurisdictional."

(P. 667.)

The question raised is, in a sense,
Since the issue raised by the

Legislature challenged the power of the people to enact a
second legislative redistricting within a single decade, we
concluded that preelection review was proper. 21
The present proceeding likewise challenges the
power of the people to adopt the proposed initiative.

The

petitioners contend that under article V of the United
States Constitution, the people have no constitutional
authority to apply to the Congress for a constitutional
convention, or to mandate their Legislature to submit such
an applicationd

They further contend that the proposed

initiative is not legislative in character, a well established ground for barring an initiative measure from the
ballot (see Simpson v. Hite, supra, 36 Cal.2d 125, 129-134),
and that it does not enact a statute as required by article

!I The exercise of preelection review in Legislature of the State of California v. Oeukmejian, supra, 34
Cal.3d 658, was not an unprecedented act. Previous decisions had barred elections on a state initiative measure
(McFadden v. Jordan (1948) 32 Cal.2d 330; Gage v. Jordan
(1944) 23 Cal.2d 794). Other court decisions have barred
elections on local initiatives (e.g., Simpson v. Hite (1950)
36 Cal.2d 125; Meryvnne v. Acker (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 558)
and referenda (e.g., Fishman v. City of Palo Alto (1978) 86
Cal. App .3d 506).
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II, section 8 of the state Constitution.!Q1

These conten-

.'

tions state proper grounds for preelection review of the
proposed balanced budget initiative.!!!
Although real party in interest recites the principles of popular sovereignty which led to the establishment
of the initiative and referendum in California, those principles do not disclose any value in putting before the people
a measure which they have no power to enact.

The presence

of an invalid measure on the ballot steals attention, time
and money from the numerous valid propositions on the same

lQl We note also the legal and practical problems
which might arise in postelection review. Section 3 of the
initiative ~dopts a resolution applying for a constitutional
convention; it is arguable that this adoption is effective
immediately (cf. Dillon v. Gloss (1921) 256 U.S. 368, 376)
and that the validity of that application thereafter is not
an issue within the purview of the courts (see Coleman v.
Miller (1939) 307 U.S. 433). The provisions of section 2
suspending legislative salaries go into effect 20 legislative days after the election. It would be possible for
petitioners to file a petition for mandate and seek a stay
within this period. But one usual argument for postelection
review -- that the court will have more time to consider the
issues and decide the.case -- loses some force when the court
will have to act on an application for provisional relief
within a very limited time period following the election.

111 Language in some cases suggests that even if
a proposed measure is within the scope of the initiative
power, courts retain eQuitable discretion to examine the
measure before the election upon a compelling showing that
the substantive provisions of the initiative are clearly
invalid. (See Harnett v. County of Sacramento (1925) 195
Cal. 676, 683; Gayle v. Hamm (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 250, 255;
Note, The Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in California (1966) 54 Cal. L.Rev. 1717, 1725-1729.) We dId not
base our decision to hear the present case before the election upon that doctrine, but instead relied upon the principle that allegations charging that a measure exceeds the
initiative power are properly justiciable before election.
13

ballot.

It will confuse some voters and frustrate others,

and an ultimate decision that the measure is invalid, coming
after the voters have voted in favor of the measure, tends
to denigrate the legitimate use of the initiative procedure.
II.

Issues Arising Under Article V of the United
States ConstitutIon

Our discussion of the federal constitutional issues
proceeds in three steps.

First, we inQuire whether the term

"Legislatures" as used in article V refers to the representative body elected to enact the laws of the state -- in
California, the state Senate and Assembly -- or to the whole
-

of the state legislative power, including the reserved power
of initiative.

Our conclusion that it refers only to the

representative body makes it clear that the people cannot by
initiative apply directly to Congress for a constitutional
convention.

We then turn to two remaining Questions:

whether the people by initiative can (a) compel the
Legislature to apply to Congress for a constitutional
convention or (b) urge Congress to submit a proposed
amendment to the states.
We must first, however, address briefly the
contention raised by distinguished amicus curiae (former
Attorney General Griffin Bell, former Senator Sam Ervin, and
Professor John Noonan) that none of the federal constitutional issues raised here are justiciable.

14

They cite

\

Coleman v. Miller (1939) 307 U.S. 433, in which the court
refused to adjudicate the validity of Kansas' ratification
of the proposed Child Labor Amendment.

The Coleman peti-

tioners first challenged the authority of the lieutenant
governDr to break a tie vote on ratification; the court
divided equally on the justiciability of that issue.

They

next asserted that having once rejected the amendment,
Kansas could not later ratify; the court, relying on the
historical precedent of the 'Fourteenth Amendment,111 held
this to be a political question within the exclusive
authority of the Congress.

Finally, petitioners

a~gued

that

Kansas had not ratified the amendment within a reasonable
time after it was submftted to the states.

The court

reaffirmed Dillon v. Gloss, supra, 256 U.S.' 368, where it
said that an amendment must be ratified within a reasonable
time, but held that the timeliness of a particular ratification was also a political question entrusted to the
Congress.

Four concurring justices went further, asserting

that "The [amending] process itself 1s 'political' in its
entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of

111 On July 20, 1868, the Secretary of State
notified the Congress that three-fourths of the states had
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment but that two states, Ohio
and New Jersey, had subsequently rescinded their ratification. Congress was also aware that three southern states
had initially refused to ratify until new state governments
were created under congressional reconstruction programs.
Congress nevertheless declared the Fourteenth Amendment duly
ratified and a part of the Constitution.
15

the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance,
control or interference at any point."

(307 U.S. 433, 459,

conc. opn. of Black, J.)
The political question doctrine has undergone
considerable change since Coleman v. Miller.

(See Powell v.

McCormack (1969) 395 U.S. 486; Baker v. Carr (1962) 369 U.S.
186.)

Judges and commentators have questioned whether

Coleman v. Miller is consistent with the criteria established in these later cases.

(See State of Idaho v. Freeman

(D.ld. 1981) 529 F.Supp. 1107, vacated as moot, 459 U.S.
809; Dyer v. Blair (N.D. Ill. 1975) 390 F.Supp. 1291,
1300-1303; Note, Good Intentions, New Inventions, and
Article V Constitutional Conventions (1979) 58 Tex.L.Rev.
131, 158-162.>
But assuming that Coleman v. Miller remains controlling. authority on the issues it decided -- that Congress
alone has the power to decide whether a ratification submitted by a state is valid and timely -- that holding does
not control in the present setting.

Hawke v. Smith, No. I

(1920) 253 U.S. 221 (discussed at length later in this
opinion (post, pp. ___ - ___*», is direct authority for the
proposition that a court can remove a proposal from a state
election ballot on the ground that it does not conform to
article V, and by necessary inference that a court has

* Typed opinIon pages 20-23.
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authority to adjudicate that question.

Contrary to the'

suggestion of amicus, the majority opinion in Coleman v.
Miller did not overrule Hawke v. Smith; it cited the earlier
decision favorably on an issue of standing to sue (307 U.S.
at pp. 438-449), and never hinted that Hawke v. Smith
decided a nonjusticiable issue.
In Oyer v. Blair, supra, 390 r.SUpp. 1291, Judge
Stevens, now a justice of the United States Supreme Court,
considered the effect of Coleman v. Miller upon earlier
Supreme Court article V decisions.

The issue in that case

was whether a state could constitutionally provide that more
than a simple majority was required to ratify a constitutional amendment.

Rejecting the

argume~t

that every aspect

of the amending process is a nonjusticiable political, question, Judge Stevens stated that "since a majority of the
Court refused to accept that pOSition in [Coleman v. Miller]
and since the Court has on several occasions decided questions arising under Article V, even in the face of 'political
question' contentions, that argument is not one which a
District Court is free to accept."

(Pp. 1299-1300.>

In

deciding questions of federal constitutional law, a state
court is equally bound by the controlling Supreme Court
decisions.
Judge Stevens went on to consider the question of
justiciability in light of Powell v. McCormack, supra, 395

17

u . S • 486, .,B a ke r v. Car r, sup r a,

:! 6 9 U. S. 1 B6, and the

majority opinion in Coleman v. Miller, supra.

He distin-

guished Coleman v. Miller; that decision rested on the
historical precedent of congressional adjudication of the
effect of withdrawing a ratification. and the difficulty of
determining what
cation.

con~tituted

a reasonable time for ratifi-

Such precedents and problems, he said, had no

relevance to the issue 1n Dyer v. Blair -- and, we must add,
are equally irrelevant to the issue in the present case.
Judge Stevens observed that "[dlecision of the Question
presented requires no more than an interpretation-of the
Constitution.

Such a decision falls squarely within the

traditional role of the • • • judiciary. • ••

[,J

The

mere fact that a court has little or nothing but the language of the Constitution as a guide to its interpretation
does

no~

mean that the task of construction is judicially

unmanageable."

(Pp. 1301-1302.)

He then concluded:

"We

are persuaded that the word 'ratification' as used in
article V of the federal Constitution must be interpreted
with the kind of consistency that is characteristic of
judicial, as opposed to political, decision making."
1303.)

(P.

We are similarly persuaded that the word "Legisla-

tures" in article V is subject to judicial construction.
Concluding, therefore. that the issues here raised
are justiciable, we turn to the task of construing the language of article V.

The application clause of that article

IS

provides that "[t]he Congress • • • on the Application of
the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several states, shall
call a Convention for proposing Amendments.

. . ."

No

reported decisions have decided whether the term "Legislatures" in this clause includes the reserved powers of
initiative and referendum. 1l1

The term "Legislatures,"

however, also appears in the portion of article V which
specifies that an amendment becomes "valid to all Intents
and Purposes • • . when ratified by the Legislatures of
three-fourths of the several States," and several cases have
construed the meaning of "Legislatures" in this

p~ovision~

We turn to examine these decisions.
Many of the cases, including Barlotti v. Lyons,
supra, 182 Cal. 575, the only California case, concerned the
ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment prohibiting the
sale of.alcohol.

When the

Californi~

Legislature ratified

III Only two decisions have considered the
application clause of article V. In Petuskey v. Rampton (D.
Utah 1969) 307 F.Supp. 235, the district judge ruled that a
malapportioned state legislature could not apply to Congress
for a constitutional convention to propose an amendment
overturning the Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment on the ground that
only a three-judge court would have jurisdiction to enjoin
the state from transmitting its application to the Congress.
(Petusky v. Rampton (1970) 431 F.2d 378, cert. den., 401
U.S. 913.) The second reported decision, OpInion of the
Justices to the Senate (Mass. 1977) 366 N.E.2d 1226, held
that a governor could not veto an application by the
legislature.
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the amendment,
Barlotti and other petitioners
.

pre~ented

referendum petition to the registrar of voters.

a

The regis-

trar refused to transmit the petition to the Secretary of
State, and petitioners sought mandamus from this court.
opinion noted two issues:

Our

whether the legislative ratifica-

tion was conclusive under the federal Constitution, and
whether the referendum provisions of the state Constitution
were intended to apply to resolutions ratifying a constitutional amendment.

It addressed only the federal issue,

finding it decisive of the case.
Chief Justice Angellotti, for a unanimous court,defined the question narrowly, as "being simply one as to
the meaning of the word 'legislatures' as used in the clause
'when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the
several states' of article V• . • • "

(P. 577.)

"If by

those words was meant the representative bodies invested
with

t~e

law-making power of the several states, which

existed at the time of the adoption of the constitution
in each of the several states, and which have ever
since so existed, as distinguished from the law-making power
of the respective states, there is nothing left to discuss,
for with that meaning attributed to the term • • • the
constItutional provision is so plain and unambiguous as not
to admit of different constructions.

The situation would

then be that the people of the United States, 1n framing and
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ratifying.

~he

constitution • • • , 'have excluded

thems~lvE!s

from any direct or immediate agency in making amendments to

it.'n

(P. 578.)

The opinion first examined the ordinary meaning of
the term.

"It certainly is not in consonance with the

ordinary acceptation of the term 'legislature' to take it as
meaning otherwise than a representative body selected by the
people of a state and invested with the power of law-making
for the state, whatever be the power reserved to the people
themselves to review the action of that body or to initiate
and adopt laws."

(P. 578.)

It then examined the California

Constitution, in which the word "legislature" appears frequently, always with the plain meaning of the Senate and
Assembly.

Even former a%ticle IV, section 1, which reserved

the right of initiative and referendum, referred to the
Senate and Assembly as "The Legislature of the State of
California."

The opinion reviewed the use of the term in

the United States Constitution, observing that in almost all
cases it clearly referred to a representative body.

Conse-

quently, the court concluded that the term "legislatures" in
article V means "some official body of a state as distinguished from the state itself or the people of the state or
the whole law-making power of the state."

(P. 582.)

Chief Justice Angellotti recognized the argument
that direct popular vote is a superior method of ascertaining
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the

popul~r

will.

He replied that the argument "is, in the

final analysis, based more upon some present day conceptions
of what the law in this regard ought to be, than upon the
_intention of the framers of the constitution as expressed
therein, and, to our mind, expressed so clearly as to
preclude any other conclusion than the one we have
reached."

(P. 584.)

The court accordingly dismissed the

petition for mandamus, thereby precluding a referendum
election on the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment.
The courts of Maine and Michigan filed opinions
agreeing with Barlotti that article

V

precludes a-refereMdum

on the ratification of a constitutional amendment (Opinion
of the Justices (1919) lIe Me .. 544; Decher v.· Secretary of
State (1920) 209 Mich. 565), while Arkansas, Colorado, and
Oregon reached the same result on state constitutional
grounds:{Whittemore v. Terral (1919) 140 Ark. 493; Prior v.
Noland (1920) 68 Colo. 263; Herbring v. Brown (1919) 92 Ore.
176.)

Ohio and Washington, however, upheld referendum

elections.

{Hawke v. Smith (1919) 100 Ohio st. 385; Mullen

v. Howell (Wash. 1919) 181 Pac. 920.)

The Uhited States

Supreme Court selected the Ohio decision for review and, 1n
a unanimous decision, held unconstitutional a provision of
the Ohio Constitution which declared that legislative
ratification of a federal constitutional amendment was
incomplete until approved by popular referendum.
Smith, supra, 253 U.S. 221.)
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(Hawke v.

~he

opinion by Justice Day

follo~s

the same

reasoning as that of our court in Barlotti.

He first

observes that "Both methods of ratification, by legislatures
or conventions, call for action by deliberative assemblages
representative of the people, _hich it -as assumed would
voice the _ill of the people.

• [,]

The framers of the

Constitution might have adopted a different method.
fication might have been left to a vote of the

Rati-

pe~ple

••••

[However, the] language of the article is plain, and admits
of no doubt in its interpretation.

It is not the function

of courts or legislative bodies, national or
the method which the Constitution has fixed","
According to Justice Day, "The only
for determination Is:

stat~,

to alter

(Pp. 226-227.)
really

q~estion

What did the framers of the "Constitu-

tion mean in reQuiring ratification by 'Leaislatures'?
was not

~

That

term of uncertain meaning when incorporated into

the Constitution.

What it meant when adopted It still means

for the purpose of interpretation.

A Legislature was then

the representative body which made the laws of the people.
The term Is often used in the Constitution with this evident
meaning.

Article If § 2, prescribes the Qualifications of

electors of congressmen as those 'reQuisite for electors of
the most numerous branch of the state legislature.'

Article

I, § 3, provided that senators shall be chosen 1n each State
by the legislature thereof, and this was the method of
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choosing senators until the adoption of the Seventeenth'
Amendment which made provision for the election of senators
by vote of the people, the electors to have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of
the state legislature.

That Congress and the States

understood that this election by the people was entirely
distinct from legislative action is shown by the provision
of the amendment giving the legislature of any State the
power to authorize the Executive to make temporary appointments until the people shall fill the vacancies by election.
It was never suggested, so fai as we are aware, that the
purpose of making the office of Senator elective by the
people could be accomplished by a referendum vote.

The

necessity of the amendment to accomplish the purpose of
popular election is shown in the adoption of the amendment.
In Article IV the United States is required to protect every
State against domestic violence upon application of the
legislature, or of the Executive when the legislature cannot
be convened.

Article VI requires the members of the several

legislatures to be bound by oath, or affirmation, to support
the Constitution of the United States.

By Article I, § 8,

Congress is given exclusive jurisdiction over all places
purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in
which the same shall be.

Article IV, § 3, provides that no

new States shall be carved out of old States without the
consent of the legislatures of the States concerned."
24

"There can be no question that the framers of'the
Constitution clearly understood and carefully used the terms
in which that instrument referred to the action of the
legislatures of the states.

When they intended that direct

action by the people should be had they were no less
accurate in the use of apt phraseology to carry out such
purpose.

The members of the House of Representatives were

required to be chosen by the people of the several States.
Article I, § 2."

{Pp. 227_228.)1~/

Ohio argued that the term "Legislatures" in article
V referred to the legislative power of the state,' however
divided between representative assemblies and the people.
Justice Oay responded that the argument was fallacious, because "ratification by a State of a constitutional amendment
1s not an act of legislation within the proper sense of the
word •• ~ •• [,J

The act of ratification by the State derives

its authority from the Federal Constitution to which the

14/ Article I, section 4 provides that the manner
of electing senators and representatives "in each State
shall be determined by the respective legislatures thereof,
but that Congress may • • • alter such regulationsi • • • "
Davis v. Hildebrant (1916) 241 U.S. 565, held that Ohio
could submit a redistricting proposal to referendum. Hawke
v. Smith distinguished that case on the ground that congressional legislation, enacted pursuant to this article,
had granted each state the right to fix congressional districts 1n the manner provided by the laws thereof, language
chosen for the purpose of permitting the initiative and
referendum. (See 253 U.S. at pp. 230-231.)
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State and its people have alike assented."

(Pp. 229-230.)

The court accordingly reversed the judgment requiring the
submission of the ratification to popular referendum.
Many years have passed since Barlotti and Hawke
were filed, but those decisions remain the unquestioned and
controlling authority.

(See Opinion of the Justices to the

Senate, supra, 366 N.E.2d 1226.)

Thus in 1975, when the

California Attorney General was asked whether the voters by
initiative could rescind the Legislature's ratification of
the Equal Rights Amendment, he cited Barlotti and Hawke, and
replied:

"The California electorate cannot effectively

rescind the Legislature's ratification by the initiative
process because amendments to the federal constitution are
~ot.

subject to the initiative or referendum process in

California."

(58 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. (1975) 830, 831.>

: As we noted earlier, the cited cases refer to the
role of the Legislature in ratifying, not in proposing,
constitutional amendments.

Courts and commentators agree,

however, that the term "Legislatures" bears the same meaning
throughout article V.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial

Court, in holding that a governor cannot veto an application
for a constitutional convention, declared that "[s]ince the
word 'Legislatures' in the ratification clause of Art. V
does not mean the whole legislative process of the State
• • • , we are of the opinion that the word 'Legislatures'
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in the ap'plication clause, likewise, does not mean the whole
legislative process. n (Opinion of the Justices, supra, 366
N.E.2d 1226, 1228.)

Senator Ervin, explaining proposed

legislation to regulate a constitutional convention, stated
that n[c]ertainly the term 'legislature' should have the same
meaning in both the application clause and the ratification
clause of Article V."

(Ervin, Proposed legislation to

Implement the Convention Method of Amending the Constitution
(1968) 66 Mich.l.Rev. 875, 889; see Bonfield, Proposing
Constitutional Amendments by Convention (1969) 39 N.D.l.Rev.
659, 665.)
We conclude that when article V refers to an
application by the nlegislatures"" of two-thirds of the
states, calling for a constitutional convention, it refers
to the representative lawmaking bodies in those states.

Any

application directly by the people, through their reserved
legislative power, would not conform to article V.
Section 3 of the Balanced Budget Initiative states
that the people adopt a resolution calling for a constitutional convention, and provides that, if the legislature
fails to adopt the resolution within 40 legislative days,
the Secretary of State shall transmit the resolution so
adopted to the Congress.

Under the decisions previously

discussed, it seems clear that a resolution adopted directly
by the people and transmitted to Congress without action by
the legislature would be invalid under article V.
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The initiative, however, proposes direct action,
bypassing the Legislature, only as a last resort.

The

thrust of the measure is in the provision mandating the
Legislature to adopt a resolution applying for a constitutional convention.

The question thus arises whether pro

forma action by a state legislature, acting under compulsion
of an initiative measure, is sufficient to comply with
article

v.
The question itself is one of first impression, but

a number of decisions offer guidance.

The ratification of

the Nineteenth Amendment, giving women the right to vote,-was
challenged on the ground that two state legislatures ratified
in violation of state ctinstltutional provisions restricting
their freedom of action.

The Missouri Constitution provided

that the state legislature could not assent to any amendment
that

wo~ld

impair the right to local self-government; the

Tennessee Constitution provided that the legislature could
not act upon any amendment until an election intervened.
The Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that
"[t]he function of a state legislature in ratifying a
proposed amendment to the rederal Constitution • • • is a
federal function derived from the Federal Constitution; and
it transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the
people of a state."

(Leser

v~

Garnett (1922) 258 U.S. 130,

137; see also Trombetta v. Florida (M.D. Fla. 1973) 353
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F.Supp. 575; Walker v. Dunn (Tenn. 1972) 498 S.W.2d

102~)

If a state cannot constitutionally prohibit its legislature
from proposing or ratifying a constitutional amendment, by
implication it cannot compel the legislature to do so.
Two other cases involve advisory initiatives.

In

1928 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was asked to
rule upon a proposed initiative requesting the state's
congressional delegation to support repeal of the Eighteenth
Amendment.

The court held that the measure was not a proper

initiative on both state and federal grounds, stating, inconnection with the latter ground, that "[t]he voters of the
several

St~tes

are excluded by the terms of art. 5 of the

Constitution of the United States from participation in the
~rocess

of its amehdment."

(Opinion of the Justices (1928)

262 Mass. 603, 606.)
~

Fifty years later the Nevada Supreme Court con-

sidered an initiative advising the state legislature whether
to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment.

The court distin-

guished Hawke v. Smith, supra, 253 U.S. 221, and Leser v.
Garnett, supra, 258 U.S. 130 on the ground that the proposal
"does not concern a binding referendum, nor does it impose a
limitation upon the legislature. • ••

[T]he legislature

may vote for or against ratification, or refrain from voting
on ratification at all, without regard to the advisory vote."
(Kimble v. Swackhamer (Nev. 1978) 584 P.2d 161, 162.)
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When opponents of the Nevada initiative

sough~

a

stay from the United States Supreme Court, Justice Renhquist,
sitting as circuit justice, denied the stay with the following order:

"Appellant's • • • contention • • • is in my

opinion not substantial because of the nonbinding character
of the referendum. • • •

Under the circumstances • • •

reliance [on] • • • Leser v. Garnett • • • and Hawke v.
Smith . • • is obviously misplaced. • ••

I can see no

constitutional obstacle to a nonbinding advisory referendum
of this sort."

(Kimble v. Swackhamer (1978) 439 U.S. 1385,

1387.)
The Massachussetts and Nevada cases squarely disagree on the validity· of a nonbinding initiative, but both
cases (and especially Justice Rehnquist's order) clearly
imply that a binding initiative would offend article V.
Real party in interest, however, cites a decision with
contrary implications, In re Opinion of the Justices (Ala.
1933) 148 So. 107.

The Alabama Supreme Court was asked to

rule on a proposed statute requiring that delegates to a
convention to ratify the Twenty-first Amendment pledge to
follow the result of a statewide vote.

Quoting Hawke v.

Smith, supra, 253 U.S. 221, 226-227, where the court said
the framers of the Constitution "assumed" that legislatures
and conventions "would voice the will of the people," the
Alabama court reasoned that the function of deliberative
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bodies in ratifying proposed amendments was merely to .
ascertaiA and carry out the popular will.

A direct and

binding instruction to the delegates, it concluded, would
more truly and efficiently fulfill that function. 111
We question whether the reasoning of the Alabama
court applies to the act of a legislature in proposing or
ratifying an amendment.

The analysis of the federal

Constitution set out in Barlotti and Hawke indicates that
the drafters of that document deliberately chose to vest the
pow~r

of proposal and ratification in state legislatures

instead of the people.

The framers were, of courJe,

awa~e

of the difference between a representative body and the
electorate as a whole;, they knew that a legislature is a
deliberative boqy, empowered to conduct hearings, examine
evidence, and debate propositions.
assume~

Its members may be

generally to hold views reflecting the popular will,

but no one expects legislators to agree with their constituents on every measure coming before that body.

Yet,

although undoubtedly aware that the views of a deliberative
body concerning a proposed amendment might depart from those

.!.2/ Real party in interest also cites In re
Opinions of the Justices (N.C. 1933) 204 N.C. 806. That
decision upheld the validity of a proposed bill which would
have allowed the voters to decide whether to call a state
convention to consider ratification of the Twenty-first
Amendment. It does not appear that the delegates to such a
convention, if called, were required to vote one way or the
other on the ratification.
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of a majority of the voters, the framers of the Constitution

.

chose to give the voters no direct role in the amending
process; legislatures alone received the power to apply for
a national convention, and legislatures or conventions, as
Congress chose, the power to ratify amendments. 121
The only conclusion we can draw from this fact is
that the drafters wanted the amending process in the hands
of a body with the power to deliberate upon a proposed
amendment and, after considering not only the views of the
people but the merits of the proposition, to render a
considered judgment.

A rubber stamp legislature could

no~

fulfill its function under article V of the Constitution.
We conclude that a state may not, by initiative or
otherwise, compel its legislators to apply for a constitutional convention, or to refrain from such action.

Under

article .V, the legislators must be free to vote their own
considered judgment, being responsible to their constituents
through the electoral process.

The proposed Balanced Budget

Initiative, to the extent that it mandates the California

121

It has been argued that the framers of the
Constitution considered state conventions to be more representative than state legislatures, and for that reason
directed that the ratification of the original Constitution
be by conventions. (See discussion in United States v.
Sprague (1931) 282 U.S. 716, 731.) If so, it is significant
that the wording of article V permits Congress to choose
between ratification by the more representative convention
or the less representative legislature, but permits only the
legislature to apply for a national convention.
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Legislature to apply to CongTess for a constitutional conven.

.

tion, violates article V of the United States Constitution.
The resolution set out in section I of the initiative includes language which merely petitions Congress to
adopt a balanced budget amendment, and does not attempt to
invoke the application process of article V.

Since that

language does not purpoTt to bind Congress or the state
Legislature to undertake any act of legal significance under
article V, it is analogous to the advisory initiatives
discussed earlier in this opinion.

(~,

pp. ___ -___ .*)

As we there noted, the decisions conflict, with one case
(Opinion of the Justice, supra, 262 Mass. 603) ruling that
an advisory initi-ative violates article V, but a later
decision (Kimble v. Swackhamer, supra, 584 P.2d 616)
upholding such an initiative.
~

A Tesolution, whether by the Legislature or by the

people, urging Congress to approve a proposed constitutional
amendment is not an act of constitutional significance.

Such

a resolution does not call for a national convention, propose an amendment, or ratify an amendment.

We therefore

conclude, in accord with Kimble v. Swackhamer, that such a
resolution does not raise any issue under the federal
Constitution.

•

It follows that the Balanced Budget

Typed opinion pages 29-30.

Initiative, insofar as it merely adopts a resolution urging
Congress to submit a constitutional amendment to the states, .
and mandates the Legislature to adopt that resolution, does
not offend article V.
Our conclusion that the crucial provisions of the
initiative measure are invalid under the United States
Constitution, but that other, subordinate provisions are
not, necessarily raises a question of severability.

Since

the same question arises in connection with our analysis of
the state constitutional issues, we defer discussion of the
matter until later in this opinion.
III. Issues Arising Under the California
Constitution
The Balanced Budget Initiative contains three
substantive sections.

At the core of the initiative is the

resolution set out in section 1, which calls upon Congress
to submit a balanced budget amendment, and applies to Congress for a constitutional convention to propose such an
amendment.

Section 1 then mandates the Legislature to adopt

this resolution.

Section 2 provides that if the Legislature

does not comply within 20 legislative days, the legislators'
compensation is suspended.

Section 3 provides for adoption

of the resolution by the people, and directs the Secretary
of state to transmit it to Congress if the Legislature fails
to adopt it within 40 legislative days.
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Article IV, section 1 of the California Constitution
declares that "[t]he legislative power of this state is
vested in the California Legislature which consists of the
Senate and Assembly, but the People reserve to themselves
the powers of initiative and referendum."

Article II,

section 8, subdivision (a) defines the initiative:

"The

initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes
and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject
them."

(Italics added.)ll/

Article II, section 9 defines

the referendum in similar terms; it is "the power of the
electors to approve or reject statutes."

(Italics added.)

Prior to the 1966 revision of the California
Constitution, the. relevant provision (then part of art. IV,
§ 1) reserved to the people the power to propose "laws" (the·

initiative) or to reject any "acts" passed by the Legislature
(the ref.erendum).

The California Constitution Revision

Commission selected the term "statutes" as a simpler statement of the reserved power, without a change in meaning.
(Cal. Canst. Revision Com., Proposed Revision Canst. (1966)
p. 43.)

The 1966 revision also amended article IV, section

15 (now art. IV, § 8, subd. (b», which had declared in part
that "No law shall be passed except by bill"i the new

11/ The phrase "amendments to the Constitution"
in Article II refers to amendments to the state Constitution,
and has no application to the present case.
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version reads "The Legislature may make no law except by
statute and may enact no statute except by bill. nlBI
The question we face is whether the Balanced Budget
Initiative proposes to adopt a "statute" within the meaning
of article II of the CalifOrnia Constitution.

In resolving

this question, we must bear in mind the declared "duty of
the courts to jealously guard" the people's right of initiative and referendum.

(Martin v. Smith (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d

115, 117; Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of
Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 591.)

"[I]t has long been

our judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to this
power wherever it is challenged in order that the right be
not improperly annulled."

(Mervynne v. Acker, supra, 1B9

Ca1.App.2d 558, 563; Gayle v. Hamm, supra, 25 Cal.App.3d
250, 258; Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of
Livermor~,

supra, 18 Cal.3d 582, 591; see Amador Valley

Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 219; San Diego Bldg. Contractors Assn.
v. City Council (1974) 13 Cal.3d 205, 210, fn. 3, app. dism.
427 U.S. 901.)

~I Before the 1966 revision the California
Constitution also provided for the "indirect initiative."
(See former art. IV, § 1, , 4.) The voters could propose a
bill to the Legislature, 1f the Legislature failed to enact
that bill within 40 days, the matter was resubmitted to the
voters for approval or rejection at the next general
election. The 1966 Report of the California Constitution
Revision Commission recommended deleting this provision,
noting that it added an unnecessary step in the initiative
process, and as a result was seldom used. (P. 52.)
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Even under the most liberal interpretation, however,
the reserved powers of initiative and referendum do not encompass all possible actions of a legislative body.

Those

powers are limited, under article II, to the adoption or
rejection of "statutes."

As we shall explain, it does not

include a resolution which merely expresses the wishes of
the enacting body, whether that expression is purely precatory or serves as one step in a process which may lead to a
federal constitutional amendment.
A statute declares law; if enacted by the Legislature it must be initiated by a bill (Cal. Const., .art. IV,
§ 8), passed with certain formalities (1£.), and presented

to the Governor for signature (art. IV, § 10).

Resolutions

serve, among other purposes, to express the views of the
resolving body.

(See Mason, Legislative Bill Drafting (1926)

14 Cal.L.Rev. 379, 389-391.)

A resolution does not require

the same formality of enactment, and is not presented to the
Governor for approval.!!/

12/

In one California case, Mullan v. state

(1896) 114 Cal. 578, the distinction between a statute and a

resolution proved a trap for the litigant. The Legislature,
on request of the Governor, had passed a joint resolution
authorizing Captain Mullan to negotiate with the federal
government for reimbursement of state expenses and claims
arising out of the Moduc Indian War. The resolution provided for payment to Captain Mullan of 20 percent of the
amount collected, and when payment was not made, Mullen
filed suit. Citing article IV, section 15, which then
provided that "No law shall be passed except by bill,· the
(fn. continued)
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"It is frequently said that the distinction between
bills

an~

resolutions is that resolutions are not law.

As a

generalization this is probably accurate, if by 'law' is
meant those legislative actions which operate on all persons
in society, and must be enforced by the executive department,
and sustained by the Judiciary."

(IA Sutherland, Statutory

Construction (Sands rev. ed. 1972) p. 335.)

The writer adds

that "In Congress and some of the states joint resolutions enacted with all the formalities of bills operate as
law" (id.), but states in a footnote that in most states,
including California, "specific constitutional

p~ovisions

prevent a resolution from being treated as a law."

(P. 336,

fn. 4.)2?1

(fn. 19 continued)
court denied his claim. "A mere resolution," it said, "is
not a campetent method of expressing the legislative will,
where that expression is to have the force of law, and bind
others than the members of the house or houses adopting it.
The fact that it may have been intended to subserve such
purpose can make no difference. . •• 'Nothing becomes law
simply and solely because men, who possess the legislative
power will that it shall be, unless they express their
determination to that effect in the mode appointed by the
instrument which invests them with power, and under all the
forms which that instrument has rendered essential.'"
(Pp. 584-585.)
£QI Two opinions of the California Attorney
General comment on this matter. In 1943, the Assembly resolved that a government department should undertake a study
of the Los Angeles Airport; the department inquired whether
it could use certain funds for that purpose. The Attorney
General replied WA resolution of a single house of the Legislature, or for that matter, a concurrent resolution, does

(fn. continued)
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In Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond

(191~)

170 Cal. &'05, the court applied this distinction to a
municipal referendum.

It first declared that the referendum

under state law applied only to "acts which must be passed
in the form of a statute" (po 609), as distinguished from a
joint resolution, and construed the Richmond City Charter to
conform to state practice.

This language would seem to

foreshadow the invalidity of the referendum, but the court
then looked more closely

~t

the resolution in question.

The

city council had resolved to accept a gift of land and
money, but that gift was conditioned upon the city using the
money (and additional city funds) to build a new city hall
on the site donated .. Viewing this resolution as the
equivalent of an ordinance fixing the site of the city hall
and appropriating money for its construction -- an exercise
of legisfative power -- the court held the resolution
subject to referendum.

(See pp. 613-615.)

In other words,

it is the substance, not the label, that controls, and if a
"resolution" does enact a law, it is subject to referendum.

(fn. 20 continued)
not have the force and effect of law. • •• [An appropriation] can only be accomplished by a regular statute • • • • "
(1 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 438, 439.) Three years later the
Attorney General repeated: "The Constitution, with certain
exceptions, provides that no law shall be passed except by
bill. [Citation.) A resolution merely expresses the views
of both branches of the legislature." (7 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen.
381, 382.)
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.The

decisions of other states, involving the'

ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment discussed earlier
in this opinion

(~,

pp. 19-22), addressed the specific

question whether a resolution ratifying a constitutional
amendment falls within the reserved power of initiative and
referendum.

(Barlotti v. Lyons, supra, 182 Cal. 575, the

California decision concerning the Eighteenth Amendment,
noted but did not decide the question whether a resolution
ratifying a

c~nstitutional

power of referendum.)

amendment was within the reserved

The majority of deCisions, construing

state constitutional provisions

indistinguishabl~

from the

California provision, have concluded that such a resolution
is "not subject to popular vote.
Whittemore v. Te.rral, supra, 140 Ark. 493, held
that the word "acts" in the Arkansas Constitution (the same
word as:in the pre-1966 Cal. Const.) "means an enacted law
-- a statute."

(Pp. 497-498.)

The ratification of a pro-

posed constitutional amendment, the court said, is but a
step in the enactment of a law; it does not in itself enact
a law and 1s thus not subject to referendum.

(P. 499.)

The court also construed the word "acts" in Prior
v. Noland, supra, 68 Colo. 263.

"It is only in the sense of

a law, a statute, that the term 'act' is used in the initia-

tive and referendum."

(Po 267.)

Noting that the term is

used 1n connection with "bill" -- as it also was in the
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pre-1966 Ca Ii forni,3 provisions -- the court stated that "A
resolution Is not a bill.

[Citation.]

The distinctions

between a bill and a resolution are well defined • • • •
'The concurrent resolution • • • cannot be held to be a law
of the state.'"

(1£.)

In Decher v. Secretary of State, supra, 209 Mich.
565, the court concluded that "the framers of the [Michigan]
Constitution, by the use of the word "act" . • . had in mind
a statute or law passed with the formality required by the
Constitution and approved by the governor."

(Pp. 576-577.)

The act of the state legislature in ratifying a federal
constitutional amendment "is not the making of a law or an
'act' as understood in legislative pa;lance."(P. 577.)
The Maine Supreme Court likewise declared that the
resolution ratifying the Eighteenth Amendment was not
subject .to referendum because it "was neither a public act,
a private act nor a resolve having the force of law.
in no sense legislation."

118 Me. 544, 550.)

It was

(Opinion of the Justices, supra,

Finally, the Oregon Supreme Court, In

Herbring v. Brown, supra, 92 Ore. 176, concluded that "these
sections [establishing the initiative and referendum] apply
only to proposed laws, and not to legislative resolutions,
memorials, and the like."

(P. 180.)211

111 The only contrary decision came from the
Washington Supreme Court. (Mullen v. Howell. supra, 187
Pac. 920.) That court reasoned that the argument that the
(fn. continued)
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Eight years after the Eighteenth Amendment took
effect, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered
whether an initiative requesting the state's congressional
delegation to support repeal of that amendment constituted a
"proposed law" within the state's initiative power.

"The

word 'law' ," the justices advised, "imports a general rule
of conduct with appropriate means for its enforcement
declared by some authority possessing sovereign power over
the subject; it implies command and not entreaty; it is
something different from an ineffectual expression of
opinion possessing no sanction to compel
views announced.

observan~e

of the

The text of the proposed law accompanying

this inltiati¥e petition does not prescribe a general rule
of conduct.

It merely invites a declaration of opinion by

voters on a subject over which the people of the Commonwealth possess no part of the sovereign power."

(262 Mass.

(fn. 21 continued)
legislature ratified the amendment by resolution and that B
resolution was not subject to referendum was self-defeating
because under the state constitution the legislature had no
power to act except by bill. (This argument assumes that a
state legislature's power to ratify a federal constitutional
amendment derives from the state constitution and is subject
to limitations in the document; Leser v. Garnett, supra, 258
U.S. 130, held to the contrary.) The Washington court
further reasoned that it was not the resolution, but the act
of the legislature in adopting 1t, that was subject to
referendum.
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at p. 605.)

The court concluded that the proposal was not

within the reserved initiative power.~1
Thus as of the 1920's, the majority view was that
under constitutional provisions such as that in California,
the reserved power of initiative and referendum was limited
to such measures as constituted the exercise of legislative
power to create binding law -- the kind of measure that
would be introduced by bill, duly passed by both houses of
the legislature, and presented to the governor for
signature.

That reserved power did not extend to the

ratification of constitutional amendments, since.a state in
ratifying an amendment was not asserting legislative power
under its own constitution, but exercising a power delegated
to the state legislatures by article V of the federal
Constitution.
137.)

(See Leser v. Garnett, supra, 258 U.S. 130,

Neither did that power extend to resolutions which
~

merely declared policy or entreated action, since such

1£1 The opinion also noted that "[t]he mandate
to the Secretary of the Commonwealth • • • to 'transmit
copies • • • to each senator and representative in congress
from this commonwealth' is subsidiary and incidental to the
main purpose of the proposed law; it relates to a matter
which standing alone possesses no legal force; it cannot
convert into a law something in itself ineffectual." (262
Mass. at p. 606.)
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enactments did not

the exercise of legislative
power to ~reate statutory law.£11

.

constitut~

Real party in interest, however, contends that
current California practice and decisions permit an initiative which merely declares public policy.

-

He points to

Proposition 12 at the 1982 General Election, which endorsed
a bilateral freeze on the construction of nuclear weapons
and required the Governor to transmit that endorsement to
the President and other federal officials.

No judicial

decision discussed the validity of the Nuclear Freeze
Initiative, but real party suggests that policy initiative
was justified by two earlier decisions, Farley v. Healey

III The issue 1n this guise
the distinction
between a statute (or an "act," a "law," or a "bill") and a
resolution has not arisen since that date. Subsequent cases
have concerned the question whether a measure was "legislat i ve ," ":a dmin i s t rat i ve ," 0 r " a d j udi cat i ve • " ( See, e. g • ,
Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa (1980) 28 Cal.3d
511; Housing Authority v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d
550; Simpson v. Hite, supra, 36 Cal.2d 125; Fishman v. City
of Palo Alto, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d 506; O'Loane v. O'Rourke
(1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 774; Mervynne v. Acker, su~ra, 189
Cal.App.2d 558.) These cases assert generally t at legislative acts "are those which declare a public purpose and
make provisions for the ways and means of its accomplishment." (Fishman v. City of Palo Alto, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d
506, 509; accord, O'Loane v. O'Rourke, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d
774, 784.) That definition was fashioned to distinguish
administrative acts, which "carry out the legislative
policies and purposes already declared by the legislative
body" (Fishman v. City of Palo Alto, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d at
p. 509). It will serve in the present context, however,
because a resolution, as distinct from a statute, is essentially an enactment which only declares a public purpose and
does not establish means to accomplish that purpose.
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(1967) 67.Cal.2d 325, and Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v.
Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 315.
farley v. Healey, supra, involved a San francisco
city initiative which declared city policy favoring an immediate ceasefire in Vietnam and withdrawal of American troops
from that country.

The San Francisco City Charter defined

the right of initiative with unusual breadth:

it included

the power to adopt "any ordinance, act or other measure which
is within the power conferred upon the board of supervisors
to enact," and provided that "[a]ny declaration of policy
may be submitted to the electors in the manner pr6vided
the submission of ordinances . • • • "
City Charter, § 179.)

f~r

(P. 328, Quoting S. F.

ConseQuently, the court rejected the

argument that the initiative was invalid because it did not
concern a municipal affair.

"[B]oards of supervisors and

city councils have traditionally made declarations of policy
on matters of concern to the community whether or not they
had power to effectuate such declarations by binding legislation."

(P. 328.)

Thus the proposed declaration of policy,

being within the power of the board of supervisors, could be
enacted by initiative under the terms of the city charter.
Two later opinions of the California Attorney
General indicated that Farley v. Healey did not state legal
prinCiples applicable to California initiatives generally,
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but was based on the specific language of the San Francisco
.'

Charter.

In 1973 the voters in Humboldt County proposed

to "direct the Board of Supervisors to notify the Congress
and the President • • • of our desire to see a terminal
date set for the withdrawal of all United States equipment
and personnel from South East Asia . •

..

n

The Attorney

General, responding to a request from the Humboldt County
Counsel, advised that "[s]uch a measure is not a proper
subject for an initiative by the people of a county under
the [California] Constitution and general laws for county
government" (56 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 61, 62 (1973»

because.

it did not constitute legislation but instead "requests
the adoption of an nonlegislative resolution • • . relating to matters outside the purview of the county government."

(lQ.., at p. 63.)

He distinguished Farley v. Healey

on the ground that under the San Francisco Charter an
initiative measure did not have to be a legislative act.
(P. 64.)

Two years later the Attorney General referred to
his earlier opinion.

In that opinion, he said, "this

office distinguished the language of the San Francisco
charter from the definition of 'initiative' in the California Constitution.

[Citation.]

In determining that

local initiatives in general law counties cannot be used
for policy declarations, inferentially we indicated that
the statewide initiative 1s not available for such purposes
either."

(58 Ops.Cal.Atty. Gen. 830, 831, fn. 2 (1975).)
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The second case on which proponents rely is Santa
Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.3d 315.
A state initiative, Proposition 21, repealed Education Code
sections 5002 and 5003, which directed school districts to
eliminate racial imbalance, and added section 1009.6 to
prohibit mandatory busing.

In upholding the portion of the

initiative repealing sections 5002 and 5003, we stated that
"the people of California through the initiative process
. • . have the power to declare state policy.

The repealing

provisions of Proposition 21 can conceivably be interpreted
as an expression by the people of
a 'neighborhood school policy.'"

. their pref.erence for
(P. 330.)

The specific

provisions upheld, however, did not declare policy except by
inference; they simply repealed two specific sections of the
Education Code.

Whatever policies motivated that repeal, it

is clear:that Proposition 21 took statutory form.
The cited cases, thus, are consistent with the
conclusion we drew earlier -- that the function of the
initiative under the California Constitution is to enact (or
repeal) statutes.

The statute may declare policy as well as

provide for its implementation.

Indeed it is common for

statutes, including initiative statutes, to contain a section which declares policy and provides a guide to the
implementation of the substantive provisions of the
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measure.£!1

But an initiative which seeks to do sometning

other than enact a statute -- which seeks to render an
administrative decision, adjudicate a dispute, or declare by
resolution the views of the resolving body -- is not within
the initiative power reserved by the people.
We now turn to apply this analysis to the Balanced
Budget Initiative.

Section 1 of the initiative mandates the

Legislature to adopt a resolution calling upon Congress to
propose a balanced budget amendment, and applying for a
constitutional convention to propose such an amendment.
This section is in form neither a statute nor a

r~solution,

but a cross between the indirect initiative repealed in 1966
(see fn. 20,

~)

and a writ of mandamus.

between an initiative which

enact~

The distinction

a statute and one which

commands the Legislature to do so is a narrow one, but may
be constitutionally significant.

If the people have the

power to enact a measure by initiative, they should do so
directly; if the people lack a power entrusted solely to the
Legislature, they should not be permitted to.circumvent that
limitation.

In any event, section 1 does not mandate the

241 The distinction between a declaration of
policy which takes statutory form and one that does not is
functional as well as formal. In the former case, the
declaration of policy can be cited and relied upon by adminIstr~tors and courts in the interpretation and application
of other statutory provisions. A declaration which merely
reQuests action by Congress, and which relates to a matter
beyond the state's legislative jurisdiction, can have no
such legal effect.
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Legislature to enact a statute, but to adopt a resolution.
That resolution is in part a simple declaration of policy,
without statutory implementation, and in part a step in a
federal process which may eventually lead to amendment of
the federal Constitution.

It does not create law and thus,

under the authorities and analysis we have examined, does
not "adopt" a "statute" within the meaning of article II of
the California Constitution.
Section 2 of the initiative proposes to amend sections 8901 through 8903 and section 9320 of the Government
Code relating to the payment of legislators'

sala~ies.

This

section takes the form of a statutory enactment and, standing
alone, could not be cr i tized on t.he; ground that it fails to
"adopt" a "statute" within the scope of.article I L l l I
~ 111 Section 2 states that if the Legislature
fails to adopt the prescribed resolution within 20 legislative days, all payments to legislators shall be suspended
until the resolution is adopted. Petitioners claim this
section violates three provisions of the California
Constitution: (1) article III, section 4, which provide
that "salaries of elected state officials may not be reduced
during their term of office"; (2) article IV, section 4,
which provides that any adjustment in the compensation of
members of the Legislature "may not apply until the
commencement of the regular session commencing after the
next general election following enactment of the statute
[adjusting the compensation]"; and article IV, section 15,
which make it a felony to seek to "influence the vote or
action of a member of the Legislature in the member's
legislative capacity by bribery, promise of reward, .
intimidation, or other dishonest means."

(fn. continued)
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Section

2~

however, simply provides a sanction, suspension

of legislators' compensation, which goes into effect only if
the Legislature fails to comply with section I within 20
legislative days.

Consequently if section 1 is invalid,

section 2 falls with it; it cannot be severed to Obtain
independent life.
Finally, section J, the remaining substantive provision of the initiative, adopts a resolution calling upon
Congress to propose a balanced budget amendment, and directs
the Secretary of State to apply for a constitutional convention.

We previously held that this application is invalid

the'adoption of

under article V of the federal Constitution.
p. 27.)

We now observe, In addition, that

(See ante at

this resolution under section J of the initiative does not
constitute the adoption of a "statute," and thus does not
fall wit"hin the scope of the initiative power under article

II.
(fn. 25 continued)
Arguments of this character, which go to the substance of the initiative instead of the people~s power to
enact the measure, ordinarily would not justify preelection
review. Moreover, even if section 2 were found invalid on
one of these grounds, section 2 is severable in this respect.
We would still face the question whether the people could
mandate the Legislature to adopt a resolution calling for a
constitutional convention, even if the specified means of
enforcement were improper. We have therefore not attempted
to analyze in depth or to resolve the substantive issues
presented concerning the constitutionality of section 2 of
the initiative.
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We therefore conclude that the Balanced Budget"Initiative is invalid as a .hole because it fails to adopt a
statute, and thus does not fall .ithin the reserved initiative po.er as set out in article II of the California Constitution.

We acknowledge the arguments of the proponents

that there may be value to permitting the people by direct
vote not only to adopt statutes, but also to adopt resolutions, declare policy, and make known their vie.s upon
matters of statewide, national, or even international
concern.

Such initiatives, .hile not having the force of

law, could nevertheless guide the lawmakers in future
decisions.

Indeed it may well be that the declaration of

broad statements of policy is a"more suitable use for the
initiative than the enactment of detailed and technical
.
statutes.

Under the terms of the California Constitution,

however,:the initiative does not serve those hortatory objectives; it functions instead as a reserved legislative
power, a method of enacting statutory law.

The present

initiative does not conform to that model.
Even if we could uphold a portion of section 3 on
the theory that the term "statute" in article II could be
liberally construed to include a policy resolution, we would
still be impelled to exclude the initiative from the ballot.
The most important parts of the initiative, the provisions
in section 1 mandating legislative action and the part of
section J applying for

8

constitutional convention, would
51

still

~e

invalid.

Section 2 would be inoperative, sincie the

invalidity of the legislative mandate necessarily implies
the invalidity of a salary suspension intended to coerce
compliance with that mandate.

Under such circumstances, to

submit the measure to the voters without redrafting would
confuse the electorate and mislead many voters into casting
their ballot on the basis of provisions which had already
been found invalid.

As the court explained in People's

Lobby v. Board of Supervisors (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 869,
874,261 "to order the proposal to be placed on the ballot

when only a small part of it could be valid would-be using
the writ of mandate for the purpose of misleading the
voters."

(See also Alexander v. Mitchell (1953) 119 Cal.

App.2d 816, 829-830; Bennett v. Drullard (1915) 27 Cal.App.
180, 186-187.)£1 1

l!1 Disapproved on other grounds in Associated
Home Builders v. City of Livermore, supra, 18 Cal.3d 582,
596, footnote 14.
£11 Our decision in Santa BarbaraSch. Dist. v.
Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.3d 315, rejected the argument
that a different test of severability applies to initiative
measures than to ordinary statutes passed by the Legislature. (See p. 332, fn. 7.) That case, however, involved
postelection review of an initiative, and used language
which left open the test of severability in preelection
review. (See id.) On this matter, we think the timing does
make a difference. After the election, no harm ensues if
the court upholds a mechanically severable provision of an
initiative, even if most of the provisions of the act are
invalid. In a preelection opinion, however, it would constitute a deception on the voters for a court to permit a
measure to remain on the ballot knowing that most of its
provisions, including those provisions which are most likely
to excite the interest and attention of the voters, are
invalid.
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Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue commanding
respondents not to take any action, including the expenditure of public funds, to place the proposed Balanced Budget
Initiative on the November 6, 1984, General Election ballot.

BROUSSARD, J.
WE CONCUR:

BIRD, C.J.
MOSK, J.
REYNOSO, J.
GRODIN, J.
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COP Y

'.
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR v. EU
S.F. 24746

CONCURRING OPINION BY !(AUS, J.
1 agree with the majority that under article V of the
United States Constitution as interpreted in the applicable
federal precedents the initiative process cannot be used
directly to apply for a call of a constitutional convention or
indirectly to mandate the California Legislature to so apply.
Because the governing federal law so clearly evisc.erates

~he

heart of the proposed initiative, I also agree that it is
appropriat~

to remove the matter from the ballot at this time,

before additional effort and expense are incurred on an
inevitably futile task.

I do not believe, however, that it is

necessary to determine whether a small portion of the measure
-- by which the electorate purports simply to urge Congress to
propose a balanced budget amendment -- would, standing alone,
be a proper initiative measure under the California
Constitution.

Although I am not ready to say that it would

not be, it would surely be permitting the tail to wag the dog
to find that the possible validity of this minor part of the
measure justifies the submission of a largely invalid
initiative to the electorate.

{See People's Lobby v. Board of

1

Supervisors (1973) 30 Ca1.App.3d 869, 874, disapproved on
another pOint in Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City
of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582; Alexander v. Mitchell
(1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 816, 830.)

Accordingly, I concur in the

judgment.

KAUS, J.

2

COP Y

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND
CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS et ale
S.F. 24746

DISSENTING OPINION BY LUCAS, J.

1 xespectfully dissent.

The majoxity, acting both

pxecipitously and pxematuxely, has once again depxived the
sovexeign people of theix pxecious initiative right.
(See Legislatuxe of the State of Califoxnia v. Deukmejian
(1983) 34 Cal.3d 658 [blocking vote on reappoxtionment
initiative].)

In my view, the majoxity exrs in at least

three sepaxate respects, by (1) selecting this case fox
preelection xeview, contxaxy to .the well-settled xule
favoxing the initial exercise of the people's franchise,
(2) misinterpreting the fedexal constitutional pxovision
(U. S. Const., art. V) pertaining to the calling of a
constitutional convention "on application oft! the state
Legislatures, and (3) strictly and narxowly construing the
scope of the people's xeserved initiative power undex
CalifoInia law, contxaxy to the rule in dozens of prior
cases.

I.

Preelection Review
The dissent of Justice Richardson in the foxegoing

teappoxtionment initiative case set forth the pextinent
1

autho'!ities which hold that, in the absence of a showing of
"clea'! invalidity," we should not inte'!fe'!e with a
scheduled election on an initiative measu'!e but, instead,
we should defel: ou'! review until afte'! the people have had
the oppo'!tunity to exp'!ess thei'! views.

(Legislatu1:e of

the State of California v. Oeukmejian, sup'! a , 34 Cal.3d at
p. 681 [dis. opn.]; see Bl:osnahan v. Eu (1982) 31 Cal.3d 1,
4.)

Even "gtave doubts" '!ega'!ding the validity of an

initiative do not requil:e p'!eelection teview.

(Gayle v.

Hamm (1972) 25 CaI.App.3d 250, 256.)
OUt

'!ecent pteelection '!eview of the 1983

reapportionment initiative was "the fi'!st time in 35 years
this coutt has removed from the ballot a qualified initi- .
ative meaSUl:e, theteby preventing the people of Califotnia
ftom

~oting

•••• "

on a subject of g'!eat impo'!tance to them

(34 Cal.3d at p. 681 [dis. opn.].)

Todayls

decision, filed less than one yea'! later, reflects in my
view a distul:bing ttend of this COUl:t to reach out and
ptematurely decide constitutional issues which might have
been tendered entirely moot by the results of the forthcoming election, and which in any event readily could be
addressed aftet the election has been held.
What teason does the majotity offet fot breaching,
once again, the traditional rule of judicial restraint?
The majority aasetts that "The ptesent proceeding • • •
2

challenges the poweI of the people to adopt the ploposed
initiative," supposedly a "plopeI SIound" fOI pleelection
Ieview.

-

(Ante, p.

-

[maj. opn. at p.

- 1.)

SUlely, the

mele "challenge ll to an initiative is not enough to tliggeI
such expedited, accelelated Ieview, fOI such a challenge
could be made in evelY case.

Instead, we must filst

satisfy oUlselves that the initiative is cleaIly invalid,
i.e., cleaIly beyond the people's poweI to adopt.

No such

showing is made hele.
As I will explain, the people indeed do have the
poweI to dilect the Legislatule to apply to Congless fOI a
constitutional convention.

But even wete Slave doubts

plesented IegaIding the initiative's validity, thele ale
good Ieasons fot defeIling OUI Ieview until afteI the
people.~ave

measute.

exptessed theiI views arid voted upon the

As teal patties hetein point out in one of theit

btiefs, "Patticipation in the eleetoIal pIoeess and ongoing
public debate on this impottant issue will benefit the
citizenty and theit elected teptesentatives.

It will allow

citizens to exetcise theit fitst amenoment tights to
exptess theit opinions."

The majotity's tuling unfottun·

ately tetminates abluptly any widesplead public debate by
Califolnia citizens tegaIding a mattet so clueial to theit

own, and theit nation's, financial well being.

Might not

the Legislatute, the Congtess and the votels each have
welcomed a public aiting of this impottant lssue1
3

..

In addition, I question the

p~op~iety

or necessity

of· the "rush to judgment" exhibited in this case, resulting
from the majority's attempt to file its decision before
impending election deadlines.

Most of the briefing in this

case was completed only a few days

to

prio~

How can this

cou~t,

al~eady

argument;

afte~ hea~ing

we filed today's opinion only a few days
a~gument.

o~al

that

swamped with

hundreds of pending cases, expect to reach a reasoned
determination of the complex issues presented herein

unde~

such adverse circumstances1
Finally, several well· respected amici (former
Attor.ney General
and

P~ofessor

.G~iffin

Bell, former

John Noonan) have

argument against preelection

~aised

(o~

xeviewwhich stxikes me as quite

Senato~

Sam Irvin,

an additional

indeed any) judicial
pe~suasive:

A couxt, and

especially a state court, should not pass upon the
essentially political question regarding the validity of an
application for a constitutional convention pursuant to
article V of the

fede~al

Constitution.

(See Coleman v.

Miller (1939) 307 u.S. 433 [plurality opn., declining
~eview

of validity of state ratification of constitutional

amendment].)
body alone

Instead, we should

ent~usted

defe~

to

Cong~ess,

the

by the federal Constitution with the

xesponsibility to xeceive and review such applications.
1 indicate iathe following part of this opinion, it is

4

As

"

quite likely that Congyess would conclude that the
application is, constitutionally valid.

What possible haYm

could yesult fyom OUy defexxing to Congtess xegaxding this
fedexal question?
II.

Validity Undey Fedexal Law--The Convention Clause
A%ticle V of the fedeyal Constitution in pextinent

paxt pxovides that Congxess "on the application of the
Legislatuxes of two-thixds of the sevexal States, shall
call a convention fox pxoposing amendments" to the
Constitution.

(Italics added.)

Such pxoposed amendments

"shall be valid • • • when xatified by the Legislatuxes of
thxee-fouxths of the sevexal States, ox by conventions in
thxee-fouxths theIeof • • • • "

Contxaxy to the majoxity

hexein, the challenged initiative measuye is not in
confli~t

with the foxegoing constitutional pxovision.

The

initiative simply dixects the LegislatuIe to file the
tequisite application so that Califoxnia may be counted as
suppoxting the calling of a constitutional convention.
Whete is the "cleat invalidity" undex fedeIal law in that
ptocedute'?
Thus, section one, subdivision (a), of the
challenged initiative meaSUIe tecites that "The People of
the State of Califotnia heteby mandate that the Califotnia
Legislatuxe adopt the following tesolution and submit the
same to the Congxess • • • • n

The tesolution which follows
5

urges Congress to p'topose a balanced budget amendment to
the federal Constitution and makes "application" to
Congress for the calling ofa constitutional convention to
consider such an amendment.

Assuming that, under

Califo'tnia law, the initiative process may be used for this
purpose (a subject I discuss in part III hereof), what
basis exists fo't holding that the measure contravenes the
federal constitutional requirements of article V'l

That

a'tticle 'tequires an "application" f'rom the Legislature; the
challenged measure is designed to provide such an application.
This is not a case wheIe the vote'ts aIe attempting
to abIogate pIior completed legislative action.

(E.g.,

Hawke v. Smith (1920) 253 U.S. 221, 227-230; Batlottiv.
Lyons .(1920) 182 Cal. 575, 578-584.)

In both Hawke and

Barlotti, the state LegislatuIes had already ratified the
18th Amendment ("prohibition") by joint resolution.
Nevertheless, referendum petitions were the'teafter
c1Iculated for the purpose of submitting the question to
the voters for their approval or rejection.

Both courts

quite properly held that, under article V of the federal
Constitution, the term "Legislature" 'tefers only to the
official representative body or bodies of the various
states, rathe't than to the legislative power itself, as
exercised th'tough the referendum.
6

Accordingly, the filing

·

of the joint legislative xesolutions
xatification process.

e~hausted

the

As stated in Hawke, latification "is

but the expression of the assent of the state to a proposed
amendment."

(Po 229.)

Because article V mandated that

such assent be expxessed by the "Legislatuxe," the
xeferendum process was deemed inapplicable and incapable of
abrogating the priox expxession of

legi~lative

will.

In the pxesent case, in contxast to Hawke and
Barlotti, no attempt is made to "undo" any prior, completed
legislative act which already had triggered a fedexal
constitutional process such as calling a convention ox
xatifying a proposed amendment.

Instead, here the initi-

ative process is being used to assuxe that such an act
finally is undextaken by oux Legislatuxe.

Axticle V does

not PQrpoxt to pxohibit the use of "the initiative process
as one means of inducing a state legislatuxe to act.
Indeed, as the foregoing cases make clear, the sole concexn
of article V is that the tequest for a convention call take
the form of an application by a state legislature.

As

pxeviously discussed, that concexn is satisfied hexe.
III.

Validity Under California Law--The Initiative Process
Is an initiative measure which directs the state

Legislature to apply fox a constitutional convention
"clearly invalid" undex Califoxnia law?

Clearly not.

Befote confronting that issue, however, we should fixst
7
'.

xeview ceytain fundamental pYinciples which contxol oux
disposition.

Fixst and fotemost, "All political powet 1s

inhetent in the people.

Govetnment is instituted fot theit

pyotection, secuyity, and benefit, and they have the xight
to alter or teform it when the public good may tequire."
(Cal. Const., axt. II, § 1.)

A cotollary to this is that

"the legislative powet of this State is vested in the
Califoynia Legislature_ • • • , but the people yeserve to
themselves the powets of initiative and referendum."
att. IV, § 1, italics added.>

{M.,

Finally, "The initiative is

the powet of the electors to pIopose statutes and amendments to the Cons.titution and to adopt or

(g., art. II,

'[ej~ct

them."

§ 8, subd. <a>.)

The majority would apply a na'[row consttuction of
the scope of the initiative powet under the California
Constitution.

In the majotity's view, directing the

Legislatute to apply fot a constitutional convention
involves neithex a "statute" not an "amendment" to the
state Constitution.

But use of such a nayyow construction

of the people's initiative Yight is directly conttaty to
the teachings of pxiot decisions of this court which
tequire a liberal construction favoting the exetcise of the
initiative povet.
Justice Tobtinet set foyth the applicable
ptinciples as follows:

"The amendment of the Califotnia
8

.,

Constitution in,19ll to provide for the initiative and
referendum signifies one of the outstanding achievements of
the progressive movement of the early 1900's.

DTafted in

light of the theory· .that all poveI of gove'Inment ultimately
resides in the people, the amendment speaks of the initiative and IefeIendum, not as a right gIanted the people,
but as a power reseIved by them.

Declaring it 'the duty of

the courts to jealously guard this Iight of the people'
(Martin v. Smith (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 115, 117 [1 Cal.
Rptr. 307]), the COUlts have described the

initi~tive a~d

refeIendum as articulating 'one of the most precious rights
or.OU'I democratic process' (Mervynne v. Acke'I [1961]
189 Cal.App.2d 558, 563 [11 Cal-RptI.

34~]).

'[I]t'has

long been our judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to this power whe'IeVeI it is challenged in order that
the right be not imp'Ioperly annulled.

If doubts can

reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve
power, COUltS will preserve it.'

(Mervynne v. Acke'I,

supra, 189 Cal.App.2d 558, 563-564; Gayle v. Hamm, supra,
25 Cal.App.3d 250, 258.)"

(Associated Home Bullde'Is etc.,

Inc. v. City of Livermo'te (1976) 18 Ca1.3d 582, 591
[135 Ca1.Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473,92 A.L.R.3d 1038], italics
added, fns. omitted.)
Since Associated Home Bul1de'Is, we have often
followed these admonitions regarding this constitutional
9
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~ight.

(See, e.g.,

B~osnahan

v. B%own (1982) 32 Cal.3d

236, 241 [186 Cal.Rptx. 30, 651 P.2d 274] [upholding the
''Victims' Bill of Rights" initiative]; Fait: Political
Pxactices Com. v. Supet:iox Couxt (1979) 25 Cal.3d 33, 41
[157 Cal.Rptx. 855, 599 P.2d 46] (upholding, in most
tespects, the Political Refotm Act of 1974]; Amadox Valley
Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization
(197"8) 22 Cal.3d 208, 219-220, 248 [149 Cal.Rptx. 239,
583 P.2d 1281] [upholding the Ja%vis-Gann pxopexty tax
initiative]; see also Legislatu%e of the State of
Califo%nia, supxa, 34 Cal.3d 658, 683 [dis. opo.].)
Unde% a libe%al constxuction of the "pxecious" and
xese%ved initiative powe%, the people clea%ly -would have
autho%ity to ditect thei% own xeptesentatives in the state
Legis\atu~e

to apply fot a constitutional convention.

Such

an initiative measu%e teasonably could be deemed a pxoposal
fot the adoption of a "statute."
The%e is no fixed, immutable definition of the
tet:m IIstatute."
~itten

The te%m could xefet to any foxmal,

exexcise of legislative powex, whethex ox not

codified and placed within the Califo%nia codes.
of Civil P%ocedu%e defines IIstatute" as any
othex than a constitution.

The Code

'~itten

law"

(§ 1897; see also foxmex Cal.

Const., axt. IV, § 1 [initiative is thepowex to pxopose
IIlawsU].)

The people' s

Wt: itten

10

dit:ective to the

Legislatu%e, mandating it to apply for a constitutional
convention, certainly would qualify as a written law, i.e.,
a statute.
~each

Under this interpretation, we do not need to

the further issue

t~oubling

the majority. namely,

whether a legislative resolution applying for a constitutional convention is a statute.

The statute involved here

is the one enacted by the people, directing the Legislature
to submit that application.
For example, a recent initiative measuye in

pa~t

tequired the Legislature to adopt ptovisions implementing
the right of ctime victims to monetaty testitution.
(Prop. 8, ,adopted at the June 19B2Primary Election, now
art. I, § 28, subd. (b).)

Is not this procedutal mandate

from the people to the Legislature a ''wtitten law"?

If so,

then ift what tespects does the initiative measuye before us
fail to qualify as ptoposing such a law?

Would it have

made any diffetence if ouy measure had recited that its
text would be formally incotporated into a new section of
the Govetnment Code?

Surely such formalism cannot pyevail

ovet the people's right to be heatd on matte%s of gyave
impo%tance to them.

Indeed, OU% ptior cases requiye us to

resolve all doubts in favor of the exercise of the
initiative power, especially where the subject matter of
the measure is of public interest and concern.
Santa

Ba~ba%a

{See

School District v. Santa Barbata Supe%ior
11
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Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 315, 330 [state initiative measure
declaring state policy on forced busing]; Farley v. Healey
(1967) 67 Cal.2d 325. 328-329 [local initiative measure
adopting policy favoring immediate ceasefl1:e and withdrawal
from Vietnam].)

As stated in the Santa Barbara case, "The

people of California through the initiative process, have
the power to declare state policy."

(Po 330.)

Surely,

then, they have the power to direct the Legislature, as
their representatives, to declare such policy on their
behalf.
We should bear in mind that, unlike the limited
referendum power, the initiative is not confined by any
state constitutional restrictions upon its scope or use.
(See Cal. Const., art. 11, §§ 8, 9; Carlson v. Cory (1983)
139 Cal.App.3d 724, 728 [repeal of state inheritance and
gift taxes].)

As Carlson observes, "there is nothing in

our state Constitution which prohibits the use of the
statutory initiative to repeal tax law."

(P. 731.)

Similarly, nothing in the state Constitution forbids use of
the initiative to direct the Legislature to apply for a
constitutional convention.
In a case upholding the validity of another
statewide initiative measure (Prop. 13, adopted June 6,

1978, now Cal. Const., art. XllLA) , we acknowledged that
the initiative may be viewed as a "legislative battering
12

'"

'C"

1:am" aimed at: "'t:eay[ing] t:hyough the exaspeyating tangle
of the txaditional legislative pxoceduye and st1:ik[ing]
diyectly towaxd the desiyed end.'

[Citation.]"

(Amadoy

Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, supya, 22 Cal.3d 208, 228.)

Given the

numeyous xejected oy abandoned bills aimed at accomplishing
the end sought by the initiative measuye challenged in this
case, the foxegoing descYiption seems unusually apt.

As in

Amadoy Valley, "Although we expxess neithex appxoval noy
disappyoval of the [measuye] f1:om the standpoint of sound
fiscal oy social policy" (p. 229), we should uphold it in
recognition of the constitutional pIinc.iple that: "All
political powe1: is inheyent in the people."
art. II, § 1.)

(Cal. Const.,

Libeyally construed, the initiative powey

.

applies heye •

IV.

Seveyability
Time constYaints do not pexmit me to explo1:e at

length the validity of those additional p1:ovisions of the
challenged initiative which impose financial sanctions upon
the Legislatu1:e in the event of its noncompliance, and
which yequiyes the Secyetayy of State to act in lieu of the
LegislatuYe should it fail to adopt the xes01ution within
40 days of vote1: appyova1.

Suffice it to say that these

p1:ovisions ale enti1:e1y seveyab1e fYom, and do Dot affect
the validity of, the p1:ovision di1:ecting the Legislatuye to

13
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I
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apply for a constitutional convention.

(See In 1:e Blaney

(1947) 30 Cal.2d 643, 655.)
Indeed, each sepa1:ate section of the initiative
meaSU1:e is made "seve1:able" by the te1:ms of the meaSU1:e
itself, and if any section 01: subdivision is held invalid,
"the 1:emainder of the initiative • • • shall not be
affected thereby."

1 see no 1:eason why the initiative may

not be given effect, at least to the extent it directs the
Legislature to apply f01: a constitutional convention.

The

distinct and seve1:able questions of prope1: sanctions 01:
alternative procedures in the event of noncompliance may'be
decided anothe1: day.
F01: all the f01:egoing reasons, 1 would deny the
peremptory writ of 'mandate.

LUCAS, J.
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